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This is a time of immense change in the world of disability: change 
in how we think about disability, change in the nature of work, change 
in the characteristics of persons applying for disability benefits, and 
change in our thinking about the role of the federal government in 
assisting some of our most vulnerable citizens.
The subject of this conference is causes and implications of growth 
in the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) disability programs. This presentation argues 
that it is not just change in the size of the programs that is, or should 
be, at issue. In addition, it is change in the needs and demands of per 
sons with disabilities and changes in the attitudes of society that must 
cause us to consider some of the fundamental underpinnings of the fed 
eral disability programs.
When we started this project in 1992, the Social Security Adminis 
tration (SSA) was faced with the need to understand largely unantici 
pated growth in the DI and SSI disability programs. Our focus on the 
determinants of program growth was essential for many reasons, 
including the need to effectively plan for adequate program financing, 
adequate staffing to process workloads, and policy changes to meet the 
needs of a changing beneficiary population. The primary concern was 
whether the rapid increase in the application rate—and to a somewhat 
lesser degree, in the award rate—would continue.
Thus, the research reported on in Part II of this volume was largely 
driven by the policy needs of the government, especially SSA. In this 
chapter we review the principal findings, then discuss their relevance to 
policy issues.
NOTE- Ms. Upp died in 1996.
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REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS
The principal findings of the research conducted by Lewin-VHI as 
well as by in-house staff at SSA and the Office of the Assistant Secre 
tary for Planning and Evaluation are as follows:
• Application and award rates have peaked and now are in decline.
• Changes in the characteristics of those applying for and being 
awarded benefits are leading to beneficiaries spending longer 
times on the benefit rolls.
• The resultant decline in the termination rate may well be the most 
important driver of program growth for the next two decades or 
so.
More specific aspects of these findings are discussed below. 
The Relationship between DI and SSI
This conference considers both the DI and SSI disability popula 
tions. Usually, we have considered the programs separately, believing 
that they serve quite different kinds of persons, one group insured for 
DI benefits on the basis of significant work experience and the other 
eligible for SSI because they do not have a significant attachment to the 
labor force. Increasingly, these lines are becoming blurred. Our study 
of growth in the DI program almost immediately became a study of 
growth in both the DI and SSI programs, as it became apparent that the 
major source of growth in the DI program was individuals applying 
concurrently for DI and SSI. These concurrent applicants are persons 
with enough work experience to become insured for DI benefits but 
whose economic status is so poor that their income and resources are 
below the means test limits for SSL Concurrent DI and SSI applicants 
are now more than half of all DI applicants. Generally, the research 
finds that factors influencing growth in one program are the same as 
those that influence growth in the other, although they may differ in the 
degree of influence that they exert.
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Applications and Awards
One fundamental question underlying the research effort was, are 
the increases in applications and awards short- or long-term phenom 
ena? The answer is both.
The research reported here, as well as actual experience, indicates 
that applications and awards in both the DI and SSI programs have lev 
eled off. There were fewer DI applications in 1995 than in 1994, and 
fewer SSI applications in 1994 than in 1993. Final awards (awards 
after all appeals are heard) have leveled off in both programs. Declines 
in awards at the initial level have somewhat offset continuing increases 
at the appeal/hearings level.
Short-Term Factors
One important cyclical source of growth—more so for the DI than 
the SSI program—was the poor economic conditions that prevailed in 
the early 1990s. In a bad job market, some who meet the programs' 
strict definition of disability and otherwise would have worked may 
apply for benefits. Lewin found that about one-fifth of the increase in 
DI applications and about a tenth of the increase in SSI applications 
from 1988 through 1992 seemed to have been influenced by increased 
unemployment.
Relatively short-term fluctuations in public awareness of the DI and 
SSI programs and perceptions about whether program rules are being 
strictly or less strictly enforced also influence program growth. It is 
generally believed that the programs were administered relatively 
strictly in the early 1980s. The administration, the courts, and the Con 
gress all responded in the mid 1980s by making it easier to get on the 
rolls and harder to put beneficiaries off the rolls. These attitudes seem 
to have prevailed until fairly recently.
Another factor at work has been state efforts to shift beneficiaries 
from state to federally financed programs. Lewin found that cuts in 
state welfare programs (general assistance) in seven states and the Dis 
trict of Columbia contributed significantly to the increase in both SSI 
applications, including Dl-concurrent applications. 1 The incentives for 
states to shift persons from their rolls to SSI so that the beneficiaries 
will become eligible for Medicaid would be significantly diminished 
by funding Medicaid through block grants to the states. However,
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funding other programs, such as AFDC, as block grants would increase 
incentives to shift beneficiaries to programs, such as SSI, that are more 
directly funded by the federal government.
Longer-Term Factors
Lewin found that the aging of the baby boomers was contributing 
significantly to long-term growth in application and awards for both 
programs. 2 This source of growth can be expected to continue for at 
least two decades for the DI program, until the boomers approach age 
65, and even longer for the SSI disability program. 3
Another long-term source of growth in the number of applications 
for DI is the increased work experience of women and the accompany 
ing increase in their likelihood of being insured for benefits. This factor 
has the opposite effect on the SSI program, however: as more women 
become insured for DI benefits, fewer apply only for SSI benefits.
New eligibility criteria for benefits on the basis of mental and pain- 
related impairments also appear to be a continuing source of applica 
tion and award rate growth.4
An increase seems to be continuing in applicants' appeals of denied 
applications and in award rates at the appeals level. Appeals and 
award rates clearly influence each other, and high appellate award rates 
encourage more applications.
Finally, Lewin found that a decline in family support contributed to 
application growth in both the DI and SSI programs. Lewin used a 
proxy measure to capture this effect—the increase in the number of 
single-parent families. Again, this trend does not appear to be turning 
around.
Terminations
The other main driver of program growth is duration on the rolls, or 
termination rates. Work done by our Office of Disability and by Rupp 
and Scott (Chapter 4) shows that duration is up and that termination 
rates are down. These changes, in turn, are being driven in large part by 
the changing characteristics of those who are now applying for and 
being newly awarded benefits.
First, they are younger. More than half of persons newly awarded DI 
benefits are younger than 50, and almost two-thirds of those awarded
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SSI benefits are younger than 50. Second, they are increasingly likely 
to suffer from lingering impairments, such as mental and musculoskel- 
etal disorders. Awards to persons with mental disorders increased by 
80 percent between the 1988 and 1992 DI applicant cohorts, compared 
with an overall increase of 48 percent in awards. The comparable 
increase in SSI awards was 81 percent, compared to an overall increase 
of 65 percent. Meanwhile, the share with heart disease and cancer 
declined dramatically in both programs.
These interrelated changes—in the age distribution and impairment 
mix of beneficiaries—mean beneficiaries are staying on the rolls 
longer because they are less likely to recover, and in the case of DI, 
they also are less likely to convert to old-age benefits. Thus, it is 
increasingly clear that fundamental, long-run program growth will be 
driven not by ever-increasing application and allowance rates, but 
rather by the changing characteristics of our beneficiaries. These 
changes in the characteristics of our beneficiaries are not news. But to 
some of us, at least, their importance is just beginning to be fully 
understood.
POLICY ISSUES
The questions raised in this section stem from concerns about the 
change in the characteristics of our beneficiaries, the effect of this 
change on program growth, and the effect of our program on the bene 
ficiaries.
Definition of Disability
What do we define as disability? For both the DI and SSI programs, 
the Social Security Act defines disability as inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment, that can be expected to result in death, 
or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than twelve months.
SSA is being challenged to rethink this definition of disability for 
several reasons. First, under the Americans with Disabilities Act
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(ADA), as Martynas Yeas (1995, p. 55) put it in a recent paper, people 
are not either disabled or not disabled. Rather, they are at different 
points along a continuum of needing accommodation and assistance in 
order to work.
Second, many with impairments that meet our definition neverthe 
less work, while others similarly impaired do not. So do our listings 
really distinguish between those who can and cannot work? Or do they 
distinguish between those who are expected to work and those who are 
not? Many blind persons work, for example, but blind persons are 
automatically presumed to be disabled under our rules. While in fact 
some blind persons can do some kinds of work, our rules are based on 
a presumption that a blind person should not have to work and that 
there is a public responsibility to that person.
Third, the creators of the disability program had in mind, for the 
most part, those with acute illnesses, such as heart disease or cancer. 
Especially when we think of the DI program, we think of older persons 
with a steady attachment to the labor force who are struck down with 
potentially terminal disorders. But, thanks to enormous strides in med 
ical technology, some diseases—many kinds of heart problems, for 
example—are survivable that used not to be. So even persons with 
these kinds of illnesses are living and receiving benefits longer. As we 
have said, the increases in our rolls are coming from those who are 
younger and/or those who suffer from mental disorders and back prob 
lems. Persons with these impairments are not expected to die as a 
result, but improvement often is either not expected or difficult to mea 
sure. So these beneficiaries are receiving benefits longer.
If we are going to revisit our definition of disability, what should be 
our new criteria? SSA has been exploring criteria that reflect ability to 
function in the workplace, but our experience so far suggests that this 
may be difficult to implement in a way that can be codified and admin 
istered as objective national standards and in a way that society will 
find acceptable.
The Federal Role
Having raised and not attempted to answer the difficult question of 
defining disability, we move to a second: What should be the federal 
role be in providing for persons with disabilities? Should we worry less
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about a one-size-fits-all definition and more about different types of 
interventions for different types of persons?
For a long time we have grappled with the belief that our programs 
should 1) provide income support until recovery or death for those who 
cannot work and 2) encourage return to work for those who have the 
potential to work. As more beneficiaries are young or suffer from 
chronic impairments, concerns mount about the role of DI and SSI dis 
ability benefits in encouraging a lifetime dependency on public income 
support.
• Is this fair to the person with a disability? Is it in their best inter 
est?
• Is this a desirable public policy outcome?
• With regard to the DI program, what is the appropriate role of a 
social insurance program?
Moreover, SSA is an agency with its roots in providing long-term 
income support for retirees. Its primary function has been to get the 
right check to the right person at the right time. We do not have much 
experience or expertise in facilitating self-sufficiency.
As we grapple with strategies to encourage employment, we have to 
consider a number of issues. One of the most difficult of these is how 
to develop standards that can be applied nationally to determine what 
type of intervention is best for whom. This is especially difficult when 
the differences among persons with a given kind of impairment are at 
least as great as the differences among persons with different kinds of 
impairments.
There is no question that many people with disabilities strongly 
want to work. And society expects those who can support themselves 
to do so. But in providing work opportunities, we must 1) not put any 
one at risk of losing life-sustaining support, such as medical benefits, 
and 2) take account of the fact that many of our beneficiaries are poorly 
educated, have few work skills, and have had, at best, a fragile attach 
ment to the workforce.
A number of options to change the federal role have been proposed. 
These include time-limited benefits; providing only services, but no 
cash; and offering partial benefits. Each of these approaches has some
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advantages over our present system, but each presents some issues, as 
well. For example,
• What happens when the time limits are up and the person is not 
self-sufficient? What are the criteria for deciding whether benefits 
should continue? And, what is the alternative to benefits for those 
for whom benefits are the last resort?
• Is it fair to limit any category of persons with a disability to ser 
vices only and no cash support? Being disabled costs money, not 
only in terms of forgone earnings, but also in terms of the need to 
buy ongoing support for daily life.
• What might be the criteria for partial benefits? How do we define 
partial? Could a change from the current definition toward some 
standard for partial benefits be equitably and uniformly adminis 
tered?
• What is the appropriate federal role, if any, for those who meet 
our definition of disability but who nevertheless work and have 
significant impairment-related work expenses?
Subsequent chapters in this volume address these and other issues. 
They are immensely challenging and complex issues.
It is tempting, on the one hand, to think that all is well and to resist 
change in the disability programs now that application and award 
growth have slowed, to think that the disability programs no longer 
present an issue. It is equally tempting to regard growth as bad, to 
assume that something is wrong if the programs are increasing in size 
and cost. Neither is the case.
As we consider the DI and SSI disability programs, we must keep in 
mind what it is that is driving fundamental, long-term growth: the 
changes in the nature of disability and of persons being awarded bene 
fits, and the resultant increases in duration on the rolls and declines in 
termination rates.
We must, of course, be certain that elements over which SSA has 
some influence are not driving application and award growth out of 
control. We must be certain that we have adequately financed the dis 
ability programs. We must make sure that we take appropriate adminis 
trative steps to ensure that only those who continue to be eligible stay 
on the rolls.
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But most important, we must be certain that our programs continue 
to serve the best interests of persons with disabilities and the best inter 
ests of society.
Notes
1. Research conducted under the Lewin-VHI contract has been summarized in 
Chapters 2 and 8.
2. Application rates are defined as the percent of applications based, in the case of 
DI, on those insured for disability benefits and, in the case of SSI, on those in the 
population covered by the SSI program Award rates have been variously defined; 
the term here is used to mean awards in any year as a percent of applications in a 
given year.
3. Technically, in the DI program, an applicant may be disabled before age 65, but 
becomes retired at age 65 or older. This is because benefits stop being paid from 
the DI trust fund and start being paid from the separate Old-Age and Survivors' 
Insurance trust fund for beneficiaries at age 65. No such distinction is made in the 
SSI program.
4. The same medical eligibility criteria are used for the DI and the SSI programs.
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